The use of military force to topple foreign regimes in pursuit of political, security, or economic goals has long been a common tool of the United States. But a growing scholarly consensus suggests that regime-change operations often fail to achieve their basic objectives, and many produce deleterious side effects. They often spark civil wars, lead to lower levels of democracy, increase repression, and draw the intervener into lengthy nation-building projects. They also represent a fundamental departure from the principle of Westphalian sovereignty, asssociating the United States with the repression of independence movements and national aspirations.
Some in the policy community still advocate for regime change, arguing that it can be done more cheaply and quickly than sustained diplomatic pressure or engagement. But they need to consider the empirical record, which shows that regime-change efforts are much more likely to fail than succeed.
They need to recognize that a policy of seeking to remove illiberal regimes based on parochial interests can backfire. A prime example is the US plot to overthrow the democratically elected government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, in order to protect the economic interests of the United Fruit Company. The book Bitter Fruit or the more scholarly The CIA in Guatemala are both excellent accounts of this episode.
They need to understand that overusing the regime-change tool undermines the effectiveness of other foreign-policy tools that are more effective at promoting more democracy and human rights around the world. It can also derail America’s ability to advance its strategic interests, particularly in the region.